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This paper presents a model of an imperfect information coordination game which has multiple
equilibria if the incentive of players to choose the same action is strong enough. It shows how the
existence of multiple equilibria in the model and in data from multiple independent repetitions of
the game can identify the parameters. The model is estimated using new data on the timing of
commercials by music radio stations in 147 local radio markets. Stations may have an incentive to
choose the same times for commercials because many listeners try to avoid commercials by switching
stations. There is evidence of multiple equilibria, with commercials clustered at diﬀerent times in
diﬀerent markets, during drivetime hours. The estimated incentive to coordinate has a modest
eﬀect on Nash equilibrium timing strategies but commercials would overlap almost perfectly if each
station internalized how its timing aﬀects the audience of commercials on other stations. Most
markets stay in the same equilibrium for the duration of my data and the incentive to coordinate
is larger in smaller markets and in markets with more concentrated station ownership.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
A common aim in applied microeconomics is to identify whether an individual agent’s choice of action
is aﬀected by interactions with other agents making similar choices. For example, Glaeser et al. (1996)
examine whether peer eﬀects aﬀect crime, Ellison and Glaeser (1997) study whether the beneﬁts of
agglomeration aﬀect the geographic distribution of industries and Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) analyze
how the prospect of competition aﬀects market entry. Models where these sorts of interaction are
important frequently have multiple equilibria. For example, if there are large beneﬁts to agglomeration
then a model of ﬁrm location decisions may have several equilibria in which ﬁrms cluster in diﬀerent
places. Multiple equilibria are widely perceived to create problems in estimating these models. This
paper shows that it is possible to estimate a model where there are multiple equilibria both in the
model and in the data and, moreover, that the existence of multiple equilibria both in the model and
in the data can identify the parameters of the model including the eﬀect of the interactions. The
intuition is straightforward. Multiple equilibria only arise when interactions are important and the
existence of multiple equilibria in the data allows us to rule out parameters which cannot support all
of the observed equilibria.
These results are developed in the context of a simple two action imperfect information game where
each player may want to choose the same action as other players. The game has multiple equilibria
if this incentive to coordinate is strong enough. The game is used to study whether commercial
music radio stations in a local market have an incentive to choose the same times for commercial
breaks (hereafter I call this “the incentive to coordinate”). The timing of commercial breaks plays a
potentially important role in the economics of the radio industry because many listeners seek to avoid
commercials by switching stations and advertisers’ willingness to pay for commercial time should fall as
more listeners avoid commercials. For example, the average in-car listener switches stations 29 times
per hour primarily to avoid commercials and listens to less than half of the number of commercials
she would hear if she never switched stations (Abernethy (1991), McDowell and Dick (2003)). The
industry’s annual advertising revenues are around $20 billion (Radio Advertising Bureau (2002), p. 4)
and the avoidance of commercials by in-car listeners alone potentially costs the industry several billion
2dollars in revenue.1 Not surprisingly advertisers have suggested that stations should play commercials
at the same time to prevent listeners avoiding commercials.2 A simple model illustrates this logic.
Suppose that time is divided into discrete intervals. While actual time is continuous the scheduling of
music radio programming is a largely discrete problem because it involves ordering songs, commercial
breaks and other programming such as travel updates. There are N symmetric stations and in each
discrete time interval each station decides to play commercials or music. Every listener has a ﬁrst
choice station (the “P1” in radio jargon) and a second choice station. Each station is the ﬁrst choice
of one unit of listeners who are equally divided between the other stations for their second choice.
Independent of station tastes, a proportion 1−θ of listeners never switch stations and always listen to
their ﬁr s tc h o i c es t a t i o n . P r o p o r t i o nθ listen to their ﬁrst choice station unless it has commercials and
their second choice station has music in which case they listen to their second choice. The audience
of a commercial break when n−it other stations have commercials at the same time is 1 − θ + θ
n−it
N−1.
If θ>0 a station seeking to maximize the audience of its commercials should play them at the same
time as a greater proportion of other stations.3
Figure 1 shows how many stations play commercials each minute for two diﬀerent hours of the
day based on a large sample of station-hours from 1,094 stations in 147 diﬀerent local radio markets.
Stations do tend to play commercials at the same time so that there are, for example, over 15 times
as many commercials ﬁve minutes before the end of each hour as ﬁve minutes after the hour. While
the incentive to coordinate provides one explanation for this pattern it could also be explained by
the existence of “common factors” which make certain times, such as just before the end of the hour,
attractive for all stations to play commercials independent of the times chosen by other stations. Two
common factors consistent with Figure 1 are mentioned by people in the industry: stations “sweep”
1Arbitron Company and Edison Media Research (2003), p. 11 estimate that 34% of radio listening takes place in-car.
2For example, Brydon (1994), an advertising consultant, argues that “for advertisers, the key point is this: if, at the
touch of a button, you can continue to listen to that [music] for which you tuned in, why should you listen to something
which is imposing itself upon you, namely a commercial break.” He suggests that either stations should play very short
breaks which would not make switching worthwhile or stations should “transmit breaks at universally agreed uniform
times. Why tune to other stations if it’s certain that they will be broadcasting commercials as well?”.
3Advertisers would like stations to try to maximize the audience of the commercials for a given price of commercial
time but advertisers and stations are only able to measure the audience of commercials imperfectly. Dick and McDowell
(2003) describe how commercial avoidance on diﬀerent stations can be estimated from standard Arbitron ratings which
are used by advertisers and advertising agencies. Models of television station timing choices, such as Epstein (1998) and
Zhou (2000), also assume that stations maximize the audience of TV commercials which are also measured imperfectly
(see, for example, Media Daily News (2004)).

























































































































Note: based on airplay data described in Section 5.2 from 1,094 contemporary music stations in 147 local markets.  12-1 pm histogram based on 50,664 station-hours and 5-6 

























































































































Note: based on airplay data described in Section 5.2 from 1,094 contemporary music stations in 147 local markets.  12-1 pm histogram based on 50,664 station-hours and 5-6 
pm histogram based on 50,459 station-hours. 
the quarter-hours with music because of how Arbitron estimates station ratings and they avoid playing
commercials at the start of each hour because many listeners switch on then and listeners are believed
to particularly dislike hearing commercials when they ﬁrst tune-in.4
This leads to the question of how we can identify whether the incentive to coordinate aﬀects timing
choices. If commercials are clustered (i.e., played at the same time) in the same minutes in every
market then it is clearly very diﬃcult to tell whether the incentive to coordinate matters. On the
other hand, if commercials are clustered in every market but at diﬀerent times in diﬀerent markets
and we are willing to assume that common factors which favor particular times are the same across
markets because, for example, Arbitron uses the same methodology in every market, then this may
provide evidence of an incentive to coordinate. It is this clustering of commercials at diﬀerent times
in diﬀerent markets which is interpreted as reﬂecting multiple equilibria in my model. Figure 2 shows
4Arbitron’s methodology counts a listener as listening to a station for a full quarter-hour if she listens to it for ﬁve
minutes during the quarter-hour. This means that a listener who can be kept over the quarter-hours points (:00, :15, :30
and :45) is likely to count for two quarter-hours (Warren (2001), p. 23-24). Keith (2000), p. 96 discusses the connection
between the timing of commercials and when listeners tune-in.




















































































































a ne x a m p l eo fw h a tc l u s t e r i n ga td i ﬀerent times in diﬀerent markets looks like by showing histograms
for 5-6 pm for Orlando, FL and Rochester, NY on October 30, 2001. Each histogram has 3 peaks but
they occur in diﬀerent minutes.
I use panel data on the timing of commercials in 147 diﬀerent markets to estimate several speci-
ﬁcations of games with multiple equilibria. In the simplest speciﬁcation I ﬁnd evidence of multiple
equilibria, which allows the incentive to coordinate to be identiﬁed in my framework, during drivetime
but not outside drivetime. This is consistent with a strong incentive to coordinate leading to multiple
equilibria because during drivetime there are more in-car listeners who tend to switch stations more
than those at home or at work (in the model θ should be higher during drivetime).5 However, I
ﬁnd that the incentive to coordinate has a relatively modest eﬀect on station timing strategies during
drivetime. This is explained by the fact that it can be costly for a station, which has to ﬁtc o m -
mercials around other programming in a natural way, to play its commercials at the same time as
5MacFarland (1997), p. 89, reports that, based on a 1994 survey, 70% of in-car listeners switch at least once during
a commercial break compared with 41% of at home and 29% of at work listeners. Arbitron estimates that 39.2% of
listening is in-car during drivetime compared with 27.4% 10 am-3 pm and 25.0% 7 pm-midnight (Fall 2001 data from the
Listening Trends section of Arbitron’s website, www.arbitron.com).
5other stations and each station fails to internalize how its timing aﬀects the audience of commercials
on other stations. The estimates imply that commercials would overlap almost perfectly if stations
maximized their expected joint payoﬀs. I use the panel dimension of the data to show that markets
tend to remain in the same equilibrium over time i.e., commercials are clustered in the same minutes
from day-to-day. The inclusion of market characteristics shows that the incentive to coordinate is
greater in smaller markets and in markets with more concentrated station ownership i.e., clustering is
more pronounced in these markets.
The paper is related to four distinct literatures. The ﬁrst literature examines whether social
interactions or social learning matter in situations where we observe clustering of agents choices (e.g.,
Glaeser et al. (1996) and Duﬂo and Saez (2002)). I show how this clustering can be modelled as
representing multiple equilibria and how this multiplicity can help to identify the parameters in a
simple structural model where this kind of interaction may be present. Brock and Durlauf (2001), p.
3331, note the theoretical possibility of using multiple equilibria in the context of a discrete choice,
social interactions model very similar to the one used here. I develop this idea in detail and apply it to
real data. The second literature deals with the estimation of games with multiple equilibria.6 Multiple
equilibria, where a single set of parameters, data and unobservables, lead to more than one equilibrium
outcome potentially create problems for estimation because they complicate the speciﬁcation of the
likelihood. This has been dealt with in diﬀerent ways in diﬀerent contexts. First, some researchers
have structured their models to give unique outcomes (e.g., sequential entry in Berry (1992)) or focused
on a prediction of the model which is unique (e.g., the number of ﬁrms in Bresnahan and Reiss
(1991)). Second, some models are identiﬁed because, even though some parameters can support
multiple equilibrium strategies, each set of equilibrium strategies is only supported by a unique set
of parameters. The models are estimated under the assumption that there is a single equilibrium
in the data (e.g., Salami (1986), Sargent and Wallace (1987), Moro (2003), Aguirregabiria and Mira
(2004)). Third, Andrews and Berry (2003) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2004) have shown that if
multiple equilibria create inequalities for the likelihood of observed outcomes then these can be used
to identify some features of a model such as ranges of parameters. Fourth, Bjorn and Vuong (1985),
6Cooper (2004) summarizes some of this literature particularly in the context of macroeconomic and labor models.
6Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran (2002) and Bajari et al. (2004) show that it is possible to estimate
models with multiple equilibria by identifying or making assumptions about the mixture of diﬀerent
equilibria in the data. I also treat the existence of multiple equilibria as a mixture problem but the
current paper has the diﬀerence from all of the above papers that the existence of multiple equilibria
in the game and in the data is actually a source of identiﬁcation. The third literature looks for
evidence of multiple equilibria in the real world. Davis and Weinstein (2004) examine the recovery
of population and industrial structure in Japanese cities after the Second World War and ﬁnd that
pre-war patterns were largely restored contrary to what might be expected given the existence of
multiple equilibria in models of economic geography. Bajari et al. (2004) ﬁnd some evidence of
multiple equilibria, including mixed strategy equilibria, being played in a game where golf courses
in the Carolinas choose to develop websites. I ﬁnd some evidence of multiple equilibria when I
examine station timing choices. The fourth literature examines the timing of commercials on radio
and television. Epstein (1998) and Zhou (2000) provide theoretical models where television stations
placing commercial breaks within well-deﬁned programs choose to have them at the same times in Nash
equilibrium. Epstein provides empirical evidence that the major US networks do tend to have their
commercials at the same time especially at the beginning of programs. Sweeting (2004a) uses the same
data but a very diﬀerent empirical approach to test whether music radio stations have an incentive to
coordinate. A model where stations have an incentive to coordinate gives predictions about how the
equilibrium overlap of commercials should vary with observable market characteristics. A model where
stations want to choose diﬀerent times for commercial breaks (justiﬁed by some speciﬁcations of listener
behavior) gives diﬀerent predictions. Regressions of measures of how much commercials overlap on
market characteristics provide consistent support for the coordination model with more overlap in
markets with fewer stations, less listening to out-of-market stations, more concentrated ownership and
in markets where stations’ shares of listenership are more asymmetric. These relationships are stronger
during drivetime than during other parts of the day which is consistent with listeners having a greater
propensity to switch stations during drivetime.
Section 2 presents the model of an imperfect information coordination game. Section 3 provides
the identiﬁcation results. Section 4 describes how I estimate the model and test for multiple equilibria.
7Section 5 analyzes the timing of commercial breaks. Section 6 concludes.
2 An Imperfect Information Coordination Game
This section develops a theoretical model which can have multiple equilibria and explains how it can
be taken to data. I describe the model without explicitly relating it to the timing of radio commercials
w h i c hId i s c u s si nd e t a i li nS e c t i o n5 .
2.1 Model
Consider a game where N players simultaneously choose one of two actions t ∈ {0,1}.E a c h p l a y e r i
has the following reduced form payoﬀ function from choosing action t
πit = βt + αP−it + εit (1)
where P−it is the proportion of players other than i choosing action t.T h e βts allow one action to
have, on average, a higher payoﬀ for reasons not connected with coordination. α reﬂects the strength
of the incentive to coordinate. If α =0each player’s payoﬀ is independent of other players’ choices
but if α>0 payoﬀs increase with the proportion of other players choosing the same action. I assume
that α ≥ 0 but discuss in Section 3 what I might see in the data if α<0 so that players want to choose
diﬀerent actions. εit is an idiosyncratic term which is private information to player i and which allows
players to have diﬀerent preferences over actions. It is assumed to be independently and identically
distributed across players and actions with a Type 1 extreme value (“logit”) distribution.
i’s strategy Si consists of a rule for selecting its action as a function of its εs and, if α>0,t h e
strategies of the other players (S−i). i’s optimal strategy will be to choose action 1 if and only if
β1 + αE(P−i1|S−i)+εi1 ≥ β0 + αE(P−i0|S−i)+εi0 (2)
This is a threshold crossing model so β1 and β0 cannot be separately identiﬁed and I normalize β0 =0 .
The distribution of ε implies that the probability, prior to the realization of the εs, that i chooses




eβ1+αE(P−i1|S−i) + eαE(P−i0|S−i) (3)
This probability is a convenient way to describe a player’s strategy. It is straightforward to show
that if α ≥ 0 all Bayesian Nash equilibria will involve players using symmetric strategies.7 All players
choose one action so that in equilibrium p∗
i = E(P−i1|S−i)=1− E(P−i0|S−i)=p∗ where
p∗ =
eβ1+αp∗
eβ1+αp∗ + eα(1−p∗) (4)
For any (β1,α) the game has multiple equilibria if more than one value of p∗ satisﬁes (4). As payoﬀs
depend on the proportion of other players choosing action 1 equilibrium strategies are independent of
N.
Figure 3(a)-(d) shows how player i’s reaction function and the equilibria change with β1 and α.I n
each diagram the probability that every player other than i c h o o s e sa c t i o n1i ss h o w no nt h eh o r i z o n t a l
axis and i’s probability of choosing action 1 is shown on the vertical axis. There is an equilibrium
at any point where the reaction function crosses the 450 line. In Figure 3(a) α =0so i’s optimal
strategy is independent of the strategies of other players and the reaction function is ﬂat. As β1 > 0
p∗ is greater than 1
2.I f α>0 i’s reaction function slopes upwards and has an S-shape because of the
logit distribution of ε. In Figure 3(b) there is still a single equilibrium but the beneﬁt to coordination
means that p∗ is greater than in Figure 3(a). In Figure 3(c) α is higher and there are three equilibria.
The middle equilibrium (slope of the reaction function is greater than 1) is unstable in the sense that if
there was a small deviation from the equilibrium then the application of iterated best responses would
not return strategies to the same equilibrium. In the rest of the paper, I will assume that only stable
equilibria are played although, as I note below, unstable equilibria in the data could also help with
identiﬁcation. The S-shape of the reaction function, which has maximum slope at p∗
i = 1
2,i m p l i e s
that there are a maximum of two stable equilibria and that one of them will involve players choosing
7Suppose that the equilibrium is not symmetric so that a player j chooses action 1 with higher probability than another
player k.T h i s i m p l i e s t h a t E(P−k1|S−k) − E(P−k0|S−k) >E (P−j1|S−j) − E(P−j0|S−j) which, from (3), implies that
k would actually choose action 1 with higher probability than j, a contradiction. If α<0 t h e r ew i l lb eas y m m e t r i c
equilibrium but there may also be asymmetric equilibria.
9Figure 3: Station Reaction Functions and the Number of Equilibria for Diﬀerent Values of β1 and α







(a) β 1=0.05,α=0: one equilibrium





































































(b) β 1=0.05,α=1.5: one equilibrium





































































10.05,α=2.5: two stable equilibria

















































































(d) β 1=0.3,α=2.5: one equilibrium













































































































←  more attractive
action 1
more attractive →
action 1 with probability greater than 1
2 (I label this equilibrium A, p∗
A > 1
2) and that the other will
involve players choosing action 1 with probability less than 1
2 (equilibrium B, p∗
B < 1
2). In Figure 3(c)
players choose the same action with higher probability in equilibrium A than in equilibrium B because
β1 > 0.I n F i g u r e 3 ( d ) β1 increases, the reaction function shifts upwards and equilibrium B ceases to
exist. The intuition for this result is that if action 1 is, on average, much more attractive than action
0 then an equilibrium involving coordination on action 0 cannot be sustained. Figure 3(e) summarizes
these results by dividing the (β1,α) parameter space into regions which support one equilibrium and
two equilibria.
2.2 Empirical Model and “Equilibrium Selection”
Suppose that the data consists of observations from independent repetitions of the game, indexed
by m, listing the number of players (Nm) and the number choosing action 1 (n1m)w i t hNm − n1m
choosing action 0. By assumption β1 and α are the same across repetitions. If (β1,α) support a




p∗(β1,α)n1m(1 − p∗(β1,α))Nm−n1m (5)









∂p∗ < 1 (stable
equilibria) and p∗
A(β1,α) ≥ p∗
B(β1,α), then the probability depends on the equilibrium played. If
ZA
m is an indicator which is 1 if equilibrium A is played in repetition m then the probability that n1m



















This is the “complete data” probability of the observation. Of course, the ZAs are not observed so we
have to specify how an equilibrium is selected. The simplest assumption is that in every repetition of
the game equilibrium A is played with probability λ i.e.8,
ZA
m ∼ Bernoulli(λ)( 7 )
















This is the probability mass function (pmf) of a binomial mixture model with two components p∗
A and
p∗
B which are the equilibrium strategies supported by β1 and α. If β1 and α support only a single
equilibrium then (8) is equivalent to (5). Of course, the probability that equilibrium A is played may
not be equal across repetitions.9 For example, there may be factors such as laws, social conventions
or previous play history which are not explicitly modelled that make equilibrium A more likely to
8Bjorn and Vuong (1985), Kooreman (1994), Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran (2002) and Bajari et al. (2004) also
parameterize equilibrium selection using λ.T h e ﬁrst two papers assume a value of λ for the purposes of estimation while
the latter two papers estimate λ.
9Incorrectly assuming that the probability that equilibrium A is played is constant across repetitions can yield incon-
sistent estimates if this probability is diﬀerent across repetitions with diﬀerent numbers of players.
12be played in certain repetitions. In Section 5 I estimate a basic model assuming that λ is constant
across radio markets but then use the fact that I have repeated observations from the same market to
estimate a model with market-speciﬁc λms.
3I d e n t i ﬁcation
I now provide the identiﬁcation results, explaining how multiple equilibria identify the parameters and
how the data identify multiple equilibria.
3.1 Preliminaries
The data generating process is described in Section 2.2. The parameter space is (β1,α,λ)w i t h
−∞ ≤ β1 ≤∞ ,α≥ 0 and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.T h e s a m p l e s p a c e i s ( Nm,n 1m) from repetitions of the game
indexed by m =1 ,...,M where Nm ≥ 1 and n1m ≥ 0.I d e ﬁne µN as the proportion of observations
where Nm = N. I use the following deﬁnition of identiﬁcation for a vector of parameters (β1,α).
Deﬁnition (Identiﬁcation of β1 and α). (β1,α) are separately identiﬁed in this model if and only
if for any pair (β0
1,α 0),
Pr(n1m|β1,α,λ,N m)=P r ( n1m|β0
1,α 0,λ 0,N m) ∀Nm,n 1m ∃λ,λ0 (9)
implies that (β1,α)=( β0
1,α 0).
3.2 Identiﬁcation Results
Parameter vectors (β1,α) which support a single equilibrium are not separately identiﬁed.
Proposition 1. All parameter vectors (β1,α)w h e r e( β1,α) support only one equilibrium are not
separately identiﬁed.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The proof involves showing that for any (β1,α) which support a single equilibrium p∗ we can ﬁnd a
diﬀerent (β0
1,α 0) which support the same p∗ so that, from (5), the probability of every observation will
13Figure 4: Identiﬁcation







(a) Identification of β1 and α

















































































(b) Identification of p*A,p*B
n




p*=0.5 (white columns) pA*=0.65,pB*=0.35,
λ=0.5
(black columns)
be the same. The intuition can be seen in Figure 4(a) where (β1 =1 .386,α =0 )a n d( β1 =0 .781,α =1 )
support the same equilibrium p∗ =0 .8. An alternative intuition is that when there is a single
equilibrium we have only one equation (4) with two unknowns, β1 and α.W h i l e β1 and α are not
separately identiﬁed the single equilibrium strategy p∗ is identiﬁed.
If (β1,α) support two stable equilibria then they are separately identiﬁed under two additional
conditions.
Condition 1. Some observations are generated from each equilibrium, i.e., 0 <λ<1.
Condition 2. Some repetitions of the game have at least three players, i.e.,
P∞
j=3 µj > 0.
Proposition 2. Parameter vectors (β1,α) which support two distinct stable equilibria are separately
identiﬁe di fC o n d i t i o n s1a n d2h o l d .
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition for Proposition 2 can also be seen in Figure 4(a). (β1 =0 .006,α=2 .3)a n d( β1 =
−0.174,α=2 .6) both support p∗
A =0 .8 as an equilibrium but they support diﬀerent p∗
Bs. Therefore if
we observe that p∗
A =0 .8 and p∗
B =0 .20808 then this is consistent with (β1 =0 .006,α=2 .3) and not
14consistent with (β1 = −0.174,α=2 .6), (β1 =1 .386,α=0 )o r( β1 =0 .786,α=1 ). The proof shows
that any two distinct (β1,α) pairs can support at most one equilibrium which is the same. Therefore
if we can identify p∗
A and p∗
B, which requires Conditions 1 and 2, then we can identify β1 and α.T h e
proof also implies that if we can identify a non-stable equilibrium being played together with a stable
equilibrium then this can also provide identiﬁcation (i.e., my assumption that only stable equilibria are
played is not necessary for identiﬁcation). In identifying p∗
A and p∗
B, the components of the binomial
mixture, we can also identify the incidental parameter λ.
Figure 4(b) illustrates how multiple equilibria are identiﬁed from the data. Suppose that Nm =1 0 .
The white bars show the probability mass function (pmf) of n1m for a single equilibrium p∗ =0 .5 and
the black bars show the pmf for p∗
A =0 .65,p ∗
B =0 .35 and λ =0 .5. The expectation of n1m is the same
in both cases but with multiple equilibria the variance is greater with high or low values of n1m having
greater probability. As a binomial distribution has a ﬁxed relationship between mean and variance,
excess variance can only be created by a mixture of binomials. It is appropriate to consider what
might be observed if α<0 so each player wants to choose a diﬀerent action to the majority of other
players. In this case there is one symmetric equilibrium but there may also be asymmetric equilibria
where some players choose action 1 with relatively high probability and other players choose action
0 with relatively high probability. Asymmetric equilibria would generate pmfs with lower variance
(very low probability that all players choose the same action) than the pmf from a single symmetric
equilibrium.
3.3 Further Comments on Identiﬁcation
The identiﬁcation results describe how the existence of multiple equilibria in data from multiple repe-
titions of a two action game can identify the parameters. It is appropriate to make some additional
comments about these results and how they generalize to more complicated settings.
1. Logit Estimation. Suppose one tried to estimate the parameters using a simple logit speciﬁca-
tion Pr(Iim =1 )= e
(β1−α)+2αh p−im
1+e(β1−α)+2αh p−im where Iim =1if player i in repetition m c h o o s e sa c t i o n1 . T h i si s
a correct speciﬁcation for estimating β1 and α if and only if e p−im is equal to the equilibrium strategies
of the other players in repetition m (e.g., p∗
A in equilibrium A). In this case, if a single equilibrium
15is played in every repetition then e p−im is just a constant and β1 and α are not separately identiﬁed.
On the other hand, if there are multiple equilibria then β1 and α are separately identiﬁed because
e p−im varies across repetitions. Note that β1 and α cannot be consistently estimated by simply using
the observed proportion of other players choosing action 1 as e p−im because this mismeasures their
strategies.10 Therefore consistent estimation of β1 and α requires estimation of the full model which
combines the data and the model to ﬁnd what the equilibrium strategies are.
2. More than 2 actions. The results extend to the game with more than two actions. To
be speciﬁc ,s u p p o s et h a tp l a y e r sc h o o s eo n eo fT actions, so that there are T − 1 βt parameters and
one α parameter and player i’s payoﬀ from choosing action t i sg i v e nb y( 1 )w h e r eεit is Type I
extreme value. If the true parameters support only one set of equilibrium choice probabilities then
(β1,..,βT−1,α) cannot be separately identiﬁed but the parameters are separately identiﬁed if two or
more sets of equilibrium choice probabilities can be identiﬁed: the number of required equilibria does
not increase with the number of actions or parameters.11 The parameters are therefore identiﬁed (or
overidentiﬁed) if two or more sets of equilibrium choice probabilities can be identiﬁed in a T action
game which may have more than 2 stable equilibria. This problem is equivalent to identifying the
components of a multinomial mixture model with a possible ET components where ET is the maximum
number of stable equilibria in the T choice game. A necessary condition is that there are repetitions
of the game with 2ET − 1 players (Kim (1984) and Elmore and Wang (2003)).
3. Interpretation of a single equilibrium. Estimation can give parameters which are in the
region of the parameter space which only supports a single equilibrium.12 An important point to
note is that while α must be suﬃciently large to generate multiple equilibria, a single equilibrium is
consistent with any value of α. T ob ep r e c i s eas i n g l ee q u i l i b r i u mp∗ is consistent with any β1 and α





=0so a single equilibrium places no bound on α.
10The mismeasurement becomes less of a problem when the number of players is large. Brock and Durlauf (2001)
propose the use of logit models to estimate social interactions in reasonably large populations.
11This reﬂects, at least in part, the Type I extreme value distribution of the εs. This distribution implies that the
relative choice probabilities of actions t and T (with βT normalized to zero) depend only on the parameters βt and
α. Consequently two sets of equilibrium choice probabilities identify α and all of the βts . T h eT y p eIe x t r e m ev a l u e
assumption is not necessary in the two action model where other continuous distributions, such as the normal distribution,
give the same results. The Type I extreme value assumption is, however, computationally convenient in the two action
model.
12Feng and McCulloch (1996) show that maximum likelihood estimates converge to the non-identiﬁed subset of the pa-
rameter space containing the true parameters if the data is generated from a single distribution (here, a single equilibrium)
rather than a true mixture (here, multiple equilibria).
164. Heterogeneity in β1. An assumption of the model is that β1 is constant across repetitions
of the game. Heterogeneity in β1 can also explain why there are more repetitions in which action 1 is
chosen by very many or very few players than predicted by a model with a single equilibrium where
β1 is ﬁxed. Whether one is willing to assume that β1 is constant across repetitions or varies only
with covariates (in Section 5.5 I estimate a model where β1 c a nv a r yw i t ham e a s u r eo fo b s e r v e dt r a ﬃc
patterns and α varies with covariates and unobserved heterogeneity) will depend on the situation. For
example, a key common factor which aﬀects the timing of radio commercials is Arbitron’s methodology
for estimating station ratings and the same methodology is used in every market. Similarly one would
probably be willing to assume that the decision of people in England to drive on the left and people
in the USA to drive on the right is not explained by country-speciﬁc preferences for one side of the
road. In any event, multiple equilibria combined with a strong incentive to coordinate can generate
patterns in the data which cannot be explained by some plausible forms of heterogeneity. This can be
seen in a speciﬁc example. Figure 5(a) shows the pmf generated by the model with β1 =0 ,α=2 .3
and λ =0 .5 when each repetition of the game has 10 players. Figure 5(b)-(d) show pmfs of the
model with β1m = ηm,α=0and ηm ∼ N(0,σ2) for various values of σ2.13 Increasing σ2 increases
the variance in the pmf but it cannot generate the twin-peaked pmf which characterizes the model
without heterogeneity but with multiple equilibria and a strong incentive to coordinate. Of course,
the pmf in Figure 5(a) would be matched by a model where α =0and β1 =1 .3621 with probability
0.5 and β1m = −1.3621 with probability 0.5 but in many situations one might regard this kind of
two-point heterogeneity as implausible. In the radio timing data the degree of clustering is modest
and I maintain the assumption that β1 is constant or depends only on a covariate.
4 Estimation and Testing for Multiple Equilibria
This section describes how I estimate the model using maximum likelihood (ML) and how I test for
whether there is statistically signiﬁcant evidence of multiple equilibria in the data.
13These pmfs are estimated using 10,000 simulation draws of ηm.
17Figure 5: Multiple Equilibria vs. Heterogeneity in β1







(a) pmf with multiple equilibria, β1=0, α=2.3, λ=0.5
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4.1 Estimation with a Single Equilibrium
It is straightforward to estimate the model if it is assumed that there is a single equilibrium. Ignoring




n1m lnp∗(β1,α)+( Nm − n1m)ln(1− p∗(β1,α)) (10)





. As explained in Section 3 β1 and α are not separately
identiﬁed but if α is arbitrarily set equal to zero then




m=1 Nm − n1m
!
(11)
184.2 Estimation with Multiple Equilibria

















There are two ways to maximize (12). The ﬁrst method is to maximize (12) directly with respect to
the parameters (β1,α,λ).14 For each value of (β1,α), p∗
A and p∗
B can be found using an iterative ﬁxed
point procedure. Even if there are multiple equilibria in the data the log-likelihood has a set of local
maxima in the region of parameter space which supports a single equilibrium, so to ﬁnd a maximum
where (β1,α) support multiple equilibria it is necessary to start the estimation procedure using good
starting values. Therefore a coarse grid search over the region of the parameter space which supports
multiple equilibria is used ﬁrst. Feng and McCulloch (1996) show that ML estimates converge to the
non-identiﬁable subset of the parameter space containing the true parameters if the data is generated
by a single component (here, a single equilibrium p∗) rather than a true mixture (multiple equilibria
with 0 <λ<1). A second method involves estimating p∗
A,p ∗
B and λ as the parameters of a two
component binomial mixture model and then solving two equations of the form p∗ = eβ1+αp∗
eβ1+αp∗+eα(1−p∗) to
estimate β1 and α. p∗
A,p ∗
B and λ can be estimated using the EM Algorithm (Dempster et al. (1977))
which is widely used to estimate mixture models and which uses only analytic formulae. The details
of the EM Algorithm used are given in Appendix B. This method is potentially quicker because it
avoids using the ﬁxed point procedure for each value of the parameters. However it is possible that
the estimated p∗
A and p∗
B cannot be supported as stable equilibria for any values of β1 and α.I f s o , i t
is necessary to use the ﬁrst method.15
4.3 Testing for Multiple Equilibria
Identiﬁcation of β1 and α requires there to be multiple equilibria in the data so it is necessary to
test for whether there is statistically signiﬁcant evidence of multiple equilibria. This is equivalent
14The likelihood is discontinuous for values of β1 and α on the boundary between the regions where one and two
equilibria are supported. For this reason I use a Nelder-Mead simplex minimization routine (fminsearch in MATLAB)
which does not require the calculation of derivatives.











19to testing whether a binomial mixture model has one or two components where the economic model
places the additional constraint that if there are two components then they must be supported as stable
equilibria.16 I use the likelihood ratio test statistic (LRTS) to compare the likelihood of the model
which allows two equilibria with the more restricted model which allows only a single equilibrium.
The LRTS does not have its standard χ2 distribution in testing for the homogeneity of mixtures
because two regularity conditions are violated: under the null hypothesis of a single component some
parameters are not identiﬁed and λ may be on the boundary of its [0,1] parameter space. Chen
and Chen (2001) show that the LRTS for a binomial mixture model has an asymptotic distribution
which is equivalent to the distribution of the supremum of a centered Gaussian process with a speciﬁc
covariance which is a continuous function of the single binomial probability under the null hypothesis
of a single component (here p∗). It is hard to estimate this distribution but Chen and Chen argue
that because the distribution exists and p∗ can be consistently estimated under the null hypothesis, it
is appropriate to use a parametric bootstrap to estimate the critical values of the LRTS.17 Iu s et h e
following bootstrap testing procedure:
1. use the actual data to estimate b p∗ and the value of the log-likelihood under the null hypothesis
of a single equilibrium;
2. use the actual data to estimate c β1, b α,b λ and the log-likelihood under the alternative hypothesis
that there may be two stable equilibria. The LRTS for the actual data is calculated;
3. use b p∗ as the binomial choice probability to create a new set of data, under the assumption that
there is only one equilibrium, with the same number of repetitions as the actual data and the
same number of players in each repetition. Repeat steps 1 and 2 using this data.
4. repeat step 3 B times (I use B = 249). The jth-order statistic of the test statistics calculated in
step 3 estimates the
j
(B+1)th quantile of the distribution of the LRTS under the null hypothesis
(McLachlan and Peel (2000), p. 193).
16Additional issues arise in testing for multiple equilibria in models with more than two possible equilibria. For
example, certain testing criteria might reject a model with two equilibria in favor of a model with three equilibria but
also reject a model with three equilibria in favor of a model with one equilibrium. The resolution of issues of this kind
is beyond the scope of this paper.
17Lemdani and Pons (1997), Theorem 3, give the form of the asymptotic distribution where Nm varies across observa-
tions.
20It is relatively computationally expensive to estimate c β1, b α and b λ if the binomial components pA
and pB which ﬁt the data best cannot be supported as stable equilibria. This happens frequently when
the data is generated from a single equilibrium as, of course, is the case for the bootstrapped data. I
therefore use a less expensive method to calculate the LRTS for the bootstrap replications. This ﬁts
a two component binomial mixture (pA,p B,λ) under the alternative hypothesis without imposing the
constraint that pA and pB must be supported as stable equilibria. This gives a log-likelihood which is
weakly greater than if I imposed the constraint. The constraint is imposed in calculating the LRTS
for the actual data and the same model is estimated for the actual and bootstrap data under the null
hypothesis of a single equilibrium (any probability strictly greater than zero and strictly less than one
can be supported as a stable equilibrium in a one equilibrium model). As a result my assessments of
the signiﬁcance of multiple equilibria are conservative i.e., I am less likely to reject the null of a single
equilibrium. Appendix B presents some simulation results regarding the performance of the bootstrap
in testing for the homogeneity of binomial mixtures and the extent to which my tests are conservative.
5 The Timing of Commercial Breaks by Music Radio Stations
I estimate the model using data on the timing of commercials by contemporary music radio stations.
Section 5.1 explains the relevance of the model to stations’ timing decisions, Section 5.2 describes the
data and Section 5.3 presents some summary statistics and the results of estimating some simple logit
models. Section 5.4 presents the empirical results from estimating the basic model described above
and Section 5.5 presents the results from two extensions.
5.1 Listener Behavior and Station Timing Decisions
Section 2 presented an incomplete information discrete choice game where a player’s payoﬀ from
choosing a particular action t was given by βt + αP−it + εit. I now explain the relationship between
this game and station timing decisions where an action is having a commercial break in a particular
time interval.
While actual time is continuous the scheduling of commercials on music stations has a strong
element of discreteness because it involves planning the order of songs and commercial breaks, so
21that, for example, a programmer decides whether to have a commercial break with one or two songs
remaining in the hour (Warren (2001), p. 27 and Lynch and Gillespie (1998), p. 111 provide sample
schedule “clocks”). The three terms in the payoﬀ function can be rationalized in the following way.
βt allows some times to be more desirable for commercials than others. Some times may be more
desirable because of how Arbitron estimates station ratings and because many listeners tune-in at the
start of each hour. I assume that βt is the same across markets which is plausible but I do consider
below whether diﬀerences in driving patterns across markets could also explain the results. αP−it,w i t h
α ≥ 0,a l l o w sas t a t i o n ’ sp a y o ﬀ to increase with the proportion of other stations in i’s market choosing
t for a commercial break (P−it). The simple model of listener behavior presented in the Introduction
justiﬁes why a station’s audience for its commercials might increase with the proportion of other
stations having commercials at the same time. α should increase with listeners’ propensity to switch
stations. εit allows each station to have idiosyncratic preferences over the timing of commercials. It is
assumed to be private information to player i and to be independent and identically distributed across
players and actions. The εs represent two features of station timing decisions. First, a programmer
may have idiosyncratic preferences over scheduled timing arrangements because, for example, he wants
to develop a reputation for having “travel on the 3s”. Second, other programming, such as songs,
travel news or competitions, can vary and be unpredictable in length and a station would not want to
annoy its listeners by cutting short this programming in order to play commercials at precise times.18
For this reason the exact time at which a station plays commercials tends to vary from day-to-day.
Figure 6 illustrates this by showing the timing of commercials on a Boston Rock station during the
hour 5-6 pm during one week in 2001.
A station’s decision for an hour might be, for example, to have 14 songs with three commercial
breaks placed after the 5th,8 th and 12th songs. Estimating a model with this kind of choice is well
beyond the current literature and the scope of this paper. I therefore estimate the model by analyzing
a simple choice. I deﬁne two timing choices during the last part of the hour which is the part with the
most commercials (see Figure 1). I then look at those stations which choose one of these choices (very
18Warren (2001) p. 24 describes how sweeping the quarter-hours “can be done some of the time. But it can’t be done
consistently by very many stations. Few songs are 2:30 minutes long any more”. A station manager conﬁrmed this as
an accurate description of the situation.




















































Note: based on airplay data described in Section 5.2.  Shaded areas are commercial breaks.
few choose both) and examine which one they choose to estimate a two action model. I present some
simple logit speciﬁcations which show that focusing on this selected sample of stations and ignoring,
for example, how many commercial breaks a station has during an hour, does not produce spurious
evidence that there is clustering of commercials at diﬀerent times in diﬀerent markets.19
5.2 Data
The timing data is taken from airplay logs provided by Mediabase 24/7 which electronically monitors
stations to collect data on music airplay. Table 1 shows an extract of an airplay log for a Classic Hits
station. I describe the set of stations in the Mediabase sample before explaining how I use the logs
to analyze station timing decisions.
5.2.1 Coverage of the Mediabase Sample
I have logs for 1,094 contemporary music stations. BIAfn’s MediaAccess Pro database identiﬁes each
station’s home metro-market (deﬁned by Arbitron) and its music category in each ratings quarter.
The sample stations are home to 147 diﬀerent metro-markets although 14 of these markets have only
one sample station. The stations are in seven contemporary music categories: Adult Contemporary,
19Formally, the incentive to coordinate could be consistently estimated in this model by just focusing on players’
choices over two particular actions if the expected proportion of players choosing either of these actions is the same across
repetitions of the game. In fact there are some radio markets where relatively few stations have commercials at the end
of the hour and ignoring this tends to lead me to underestimate the degree of clustering in the data.
23Table 1: Extract from a Daily Log of a Classic Hits (Rock) station
Time Artist Title Release Year
5:00PM CLAPTON, ERIC Cocaine 1980
5:04PM BEATLES While My Guitar Gently Weeps 1968
5:08PM GRAND FUNK Some Kind of Wonderful 1974
5:12PM TAYLOR, JAMES Carolina in My Mind 1976
5:16PM RARE EARTH Get Ready 1970
5:18PM EAGLES Best of My Love 1974
Stop Set BREAK Commercials and/or Recorded Promotions -
5:30PM BACHMAN-TURNER Let It Ride 1974
5:34PM FLEETWOOD MAC You Make Loving Fun 1977
5:38PM KINKS You Really Got Me 1965
5:40PM EDWARDS, JONATHAN Sunshine 1971
5:42PM ROLLING STONES Start Me Up 1981
5:46PM ORLEANS Dance with Me 1975
Stop Set BREAK Commercials and/or Recorded Promotions -
5:56PM JOEL, BILLY Movin’ Out (Anthony’s Song) 1977
Album Oriented Rock/Classic Rock, Contemporary Hit Radio/Top 40, Country, Oldies, Rock and
Urban.20 A music category aggregates similar music formats. For example, BIAfn classiﬁes the
Classic Hits format station in Table 1 in the Rock category. The sample does not include every
station in these categories in the 147 markets but, as shown in Table 2, it does include stations which
account for the majority of listenership especially in the largest markets and in categories other than
Oldies. Stations in diﬀerent categories are treated symmetrically in the model. This is appropriate
as the available evidence suggests that listeners switch as much between stations in diﬀerent music
categories as between stations in the same category.21 The prevalence of cross-category switching may
reﬂect listeners’ taste for music variety as well as the fact that stations classiﬁed in the same category
m a yp l a yq u i t ed i ﬀerent kinds of music (see Sweeting (2004b) for an analysis).
I use data from the ﬁrst ﬁve weekdays of each month in 2001. The panel is unbalanced because
Mediabase’s sample of stations and markets expands over time and many individual station-days are
20The music categories that are not in the sample are Classical, Easy Listening, Jazz and Nostalgia/Big Band which
appeal to older listeners than contemporary music categories. I drop station-quarters where a station in the airplay
sample is categorized outside of the seven categories. This only aﬀects two stations.
21For example, Arbitron Company (2003) estimates the number of listeners each pair of stations in the Boston market
had in common in Fall 2002 (one year after the end of the airplay data). There were 6 Rock stations and 8 non-Rock
contemporary music stations which had been in the airplay sample in Fall 2001. On average, 15.8% of the listeners to a
Rock station listened to each of the other Rock stations and 17.1% of the listeners to a Rock station listened to each of the
non-Rock stations. Rock listeners were more likely to listen to other contempary music stations than non-contemporary
music stations apart from news/talk station WBZ-AM which is the largest station in Boston.
24Table 2: Coverage of Airplay Sample Stations by Music Category
Contemporary Number of Number of Number of Average % of
Music Airplay Home Market Home Market Fall 2001 Home
Category Metro- Rated Rated Listening Covered
Markets Stations Airplay Stations by Airplay Sample
A r b i t r o nM e t r o - M a r k e t sR a n k e d1 - 7 0( 1i sN e wY o r ka n d7 0i sF t .M y e r s ,F L )
All categories 69 1003 720 86.1
Adult Contemporary 66 221 162 89.2
AOR/Classic Rock 65 111 98 95.9
CHR/Top 40 64 131 112 95.6
Country 64 141 94 92.1
Oldies 44 64 44 92.1
Rock 61 147 122 94.0
Urban 44 133 88 86.0
Arbitron Metro-Markets Ranked 71 and above (71 is Knoxville, TN)
All categories 78 759 374 68.8
Adult Contemporary 56 135 78 78.7
AOR/Classic Rock 34 66 45 82.5
CHR/Top 40 59 96 75 91.4
Country 60 137 76 85.7
Oldies 1 3 1 40.7
Rock 42 81 60 86.7
Urban 27 58 39 86.2
Note: to understand how to read the table look at the Country entry for Arbitron metro-markets ranked 1-70.
I have airplay data on at least one home-market Country station in 64 of these markets. In these 64 markets
there are 141 rated Country stations with 94 of them in the airplay data. The airplay stations account for
92.1% of Country listening in the 64 markets (i.e., they have more listeners than the average station). “All
categories” combines the seven categories. A rated station has a non-zero listening share listed by Arbitron.
missing so that there are 51,601 station-days of data.
5.2.2 Deﬁnition of Timing Choices
The logs identify the start time of each song and whether there was a commercial break between songs.
Iu s et h el o g si nt w od i ﬀerent ways to deﬁne the timing of commercials. The ﬁrst way, which provides
most of the results presented here, estimates the length of each song and then, assuming that commer-
cial breaks ﬁll the gaps between songs where “Commercial Breaks and/or Recorded Promotions” are
indicated, identiﬁes the median minute of the commercial break. I then examine stations which have
commercial breaks with median minutes in the intervals :48-:52 or :53-:57 (but not both).22 The sec-
22I estimate the length of each individual song using observations where the song is followed by another song without
a commercial break. Its length is then deﬁned as the median number of minutes between the start time of the song and
the start of the next song. If a song is played less than 10 times without being followed by a commercial break then I
assume that the song is 4 minutes long. I then form a minute-by-minute log assuming that each song is played its median
25ond way uses the order of songs and commercial breaks. I examine stations which have a commercial
break with one or two songs remaining in the hour (but not both).
There is measurement error in identifying which minutes have commercials because the logs do
not identify non-music programming which may be placed between a song and a commercial break.
If there is clustering on diﬀerent times in diﬀerent markets then as long as this measurement error
is not correlated across stations within a market then the measurement error will tend to make the
clustering less pronounced (less evidence of multiple equilibria) and the incentive to coordinate will be
underestimated. The potential for measurement error is greater if a station plays only a few songs so
I only use station-hours with at least 8 songs.
I focus attention on the hours 3-7 pm which Arbitron classiﬁes as the afternoon drive. I do not
use the morning drive because many stations haveal o to ft a l kp r o g r a m m i n gi nt h em o r n i n gw i t h
more than half of all station-hours having less than 8 songs. On the other hand, less than 5% of the
sample has less than eight songs during the afternoon drive. I also estimate the basic model for four
randomly-chosen non-drivetime hours (3-4 am, 12-1 pm, 9-10 pm and 10-11 pm) when I expect the
incentive to coordinate, α, to be weaker than during drivetime.
5.3 Summary Statistics and Logit Speciﬁcations
Table 3 presents summary statistics on station timing choices. Almost all station-hours have at least
one commercial break except 3-4 am when 20% of station-hours are commercial-free. Part (a) of the
table presents statistics based on allocating commercial breaks to 5 minute time intervals. Around
60% of station-hours have a commercial break in either the :48-:52 interval or the :53-:57 interval apart
from 3-4 am when, once again, fewer stations have commercials. Roughly equal numbers of stations
choose each interval in every hour. Part (b) of the table presents statistics based on the order of songs
and commercial breaks. Fewer stations make each choice than in part (a) as most songs are shorter
than 5 minutes. In both parts of the table the number of stations making both choices is much smaller
than would be expected if the decisions about each choice were independent. As I estimate a discrete
length unless this would completely eliminate a commercial break in which case I assume that the song is shortened to
allow at least one minute of commercials. I assume that commercial breaks ﬁll the remaining gaps between songs where
commercial breaks are indicated and identify the median minute of each break. The break is allocated to one of the time
intervals :48-:52 and :53-:57 based on the median point of the break. If the median point is :52 minutes and 30 seconds
then I allocate the break to the earlier (:48-:52) interval.
26Table 3: Summary Statistics on Station Timing Choices at the End of the Hour
(a) Timing Deﬁned by Median Minute of Commercial Break and Five Minute Time Intervals
Number of station-hours with
breaks in both
Hour at least 8 songs any break in hour break in :48-:52 break in :53-:57 :48-:52 & :53-:57
3-4 am 50,694 39,968 9,974 7,965 64
12-1 pm 50,664 49,300 15,431 13,915 87
3-4 pm 50,963 50,375 16,737 13,559 70
4-5 pm 50,617 49,879 15,916 14,592 88
5-6 pm 50,459 48,978 16,043 15,194 73
6-7 pm 50,694 50,003 16,794 13,106 74
9-10 pm 49,927 48,187 13,558 14,640 64
10-11 pm 48,619 46,116 13,106 13,459 58
(b) Timing Deﬁned by Order of Songs and Commercial Breaks
Number of station-hours with
break with 2 break with 1 breaks with 1 and 2
Hour at least 8 songs any break in hour songs left in hour song left in hour songs left in hour
3-4 am 50,694 39,968 7,955 6,874 88
12-1 pm 50,664 49,300 13,558 12,440 350
3-4 pm 50,963 50,375 14,974 13,093 481
4-5 pm 50,617 49,879 14,735 13,767 570
5-6 pm 50,459 48,978 14,705 13,959 521
6-7 pm 50,694 50,003 15,165 12,616 481
9-10 pm 49,927 48,187 12,131 14,020 783
10-11 pm 48,619 46,116 11,467 12,981 618
choice model where each player makes a single choice the stations making both choices are ignored in
the estimation of the basic model.
Table 4 shows the results of estimating some simple logit models. The speciﬁcation is Pr(I1ihmd =
1|X,γ)= eXγ
1+e
Xγ where I1ihmd is an indicator equal to 1 if station i in hour h in market m on day
d chooses action 1 deﬁned as having a commercial in the :53-:57 time interval (action 0 :48-:52) or
a commercial break with one song remaining in the hour (action 0 two songs). The X variables
include the proportion of other stations in i’s metro-market m choosing action 1 on day d in hour h
(PROPORTION). The coeﬃcient on PROPORTION will be positive if commercials are clustered
at diﬀerent times in diﬀerent markets, although, as explained in Section 3.3, the coeﬃcients cannot be
used to form a consistent estimate of α.
In column (1) the X variables are PROPORTION, dummies for i’s music category, dummies for
t h en u m b e ro fb l o c k so fc o m m e r c i a l si has during the hour (which can vary between 1 and 7 with a
27Table 4: Logit Speciﬁcations
(a) Timing of Commercials Deﬁn e db yM e d i a nM i n u t eo fC o m m e r c i a lB r e a k
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PROPORTION
Drivetime 0.3134 (0.0891) 0.2635 (0.0871) 0.2346 (0.0578) 0.1551 (0.0573)
Non-drivetime 0.1158 (0.0810) 0.0444 (0.0793) -0.0065 (0.0452) 0.0006 (0.0432)
Dummies Hour Hour Hour Hour
Day of Week Day of Week Day of Week
Music Category Music Category Music Category
Number of Breaks Number of Breaks Number of Breaks
Hour * COMMUTE Hour * COMMUTE
Hour * MARKETRANK Hour * MARKETRANK
Hour * Region Dummies Hour * Region Dummies
Number of station-hours 376,607 376,607 212,420 212,420
(b) Timing of Commercials Deﬁned by the Order of Songs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PROPORTION
Drivetime 0.3481 (0.0811) 0.3163 (0.0783) 0.1925 (0.0391) 0.1694 (0.0396)
Non-drivetime 0.1142 (0.0789) 0.0474 (0.0772) -0.0748 (0.0375) -0.0551 (0.0360)
Dummies Hour Hour Hour Hour
Day of Week Day of Week Day of Week
Music Category Music Category Music Category
Number of breaks Number of Breaks Number of Breaks
Hour * COMMUTE Hour * COMMUTE
Hour * MARKETRANK Hour * MARKETRANK
Hour * Region Dummies Hour * Region Dummies
Number of station-hours 376,607 376,607 184,980 184,980
Note: Standard errors in parentheses allow for correlation across observations from the same station across hours and across days.
If only one station is observed in a market-day then observations on that station cannot be used as PROPORTION is not deﬁned.
28mean of 2.08 and standard deviation of 0.67), hour dummies and day of week dummies. In columns
(1) and (2) I use all stations whether or not they have a commercial break in one of the two time slots
both in estimation and in deﬁning PROPORTION.T h e PROPORTION coeﬃcient is allowed to
vary between drivetime (3-7 pm) and non-drivetime hours (the four other hours listed above). The
standard errors are calculated to allow for correlation across choices by the same station across hours
and across days. The PROPORTION coeﬃcients are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.1%
level during drivetime indicating that commercials are clustered at diﬀerent times in diﬀerent markets
during drivetime. This is consistent with multiple equilibria. The coeﬃcients are much smaller and
statistically insigniﬁcant at the 10% level outside drivetime. The results are very similar for the two
diﬀerent deﬁnitions of when commercials are played.
The most obvious concern with interpreting clustering as reﬂecting multiple equilibria is that
market-speciﬁc factors might also lead stations in diﬀerent markets to have commercials at diﬀer-
ent times even if there is no incentive to coordinate. A candidate is local commuting patterns as
clustering is more pronounced during drivetime. Arbitron provides an estimate of average one-way
commuting times (for people not working at home) in each market on its website and I use this to
create a variable COMMUTE.23 The mean and median COMMUTE is 24 minutes and the stan-
dard deviation across the sample markets is 3.3 minutes. Commuting patterns might also vary with
t h es i z eo ft h em a r k e ts oIc r e a t eaMARKETRANK variable which is simply Arbitron’s rank of the
market, based on population, and which varies from 1 (New York City) to 222 (Muskegon, MI). They
may also vary with region, so I create region dummies for 4 geographic regions (North East, South,
Mid-West and West).24 In column (2) I include COMMUTE, MARKETRANK and the region
dummies allowing their eﬀects to vary by hour. The drivetime PROPORTION coeﬃcients fall only
slightly and, in fact, they fall by less than the non-drivetime coeﬃcients. This shows that clustering
is not explained by those aspects of commuting patterns which are correlated with commuting time,
market size or region. A station manager also said that while commuting patterns may aﬀect how
23Arbitron’s estimates are based on data from the long-form version of the 2000 Census. Arbitron’s website is
www.arbitron.com.
24The North East region includes markets in ME, NH, VT, MA, RI, CT, NY, PA and NJ. The Mid-West region
i n c l u d e sO H ,I N ,M I ,I L ,W I ,I A ,M O ,M N ,K S ,N E ,N Da n dS D . T h eS o u t hr e g i o ni n c l u d e sF L ,G A ,S C ,N C ,V A ,
WV, MD, DE, KY, TN, AL, MS, LA, AK, OK, TX and Washington DC. The West region includes the remaining states
including Hawaii.
29many commercials are played during an hour but they would be unlikely to aﬀect a ﬁne choice such
as whether to have a break at 4:50 rather than 4:55 for which timing relative to other stations would
be more important.
Columns (3) presents a speciﬁcation which is close to the basic model which I estimate. Only
stations choosing either action 0 or action 1 (but not both) are used in estimation and in deﬁning
PROPORTION. The column (3) speciﬁcation includes only hour dummies. The PROPORTION
coeﬃcients are positive and highly signiﬁcant during drivetime and insigniﬁcant or negative outside
drivetime. In column (4) I add the same controls as in column (2). The drivetime coeﬃcients fall but
remain statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The drivetime coeﬃcients in columns (3) and (4) are
smaller than those in columns (1) and (2) indicating that focusing on timing choices between actions 0
and 1 ignores some clustering as there are some markets in which relatively few stations choose either
of these actions.25 Therefore estimating the model using only stations which choose these actions will
lead me to underestimate the incentive to coordinate.
5.4 Results from the Basic Model
Table 5(a) presents the results from estimating the model of Section 2 separately for each drivetime
hour. Action 0 is deﬁned as having a commercial in the :48-:52 time interval and action 1 is deﬁned as
having a commercial in the :53-:57 time interval. Stations not choosing either action are excluded from
the estimation. Every market-day observation is treated as a separate and independent observation
of the game and β1,α and λ are assumed to be identical across market-days. Standard errors are
calculated using a resampling bootstrap procedure. In each replication of the procedure markets are
drawn, with replacement, from the data. Markets, rather than market-days, are sampled to allow for
correlations across observations from the same market. The procedure is repeated 25 times.
The ﬁrst set of results in each column show the estimates when it is assumed that the same
equilibrium is played in every market-day observation. β1 and α are not separately identiﬁed and
the reported estimate of β1 assumes that α is equal to zero. The coeﬃcient is negative in hours
25For example, the drivetime PROPORTION coeﬃcient in column (2), median minute speciﬁcation, implies that a
10% increase from the mean in the proportion of other stations in the market choosing action 1 is associated with a
0.515% increase in the probability of a station choosing action 1. The column (4) coeﬃcient implies that a 10% increase
in the proportion of other stations choosing action 1 is associated with a 0.379% increase in the probability of a station
choosing action 1.
30Table 5: Basic Model Results with Timing Deﬁned by the Median Minute of a Commercial Break
(a) Afternoon Drivetime Hours
3-4 pm 4-5 pm 5-6 pm 6-7 pm
One Equilibrium Model
β1 (assuming α =0 ) -0.2116 (0.0450) -0.0874 (0.0406) -0.0546 (0.0424) -0.2492 (0.0437)
Log-likelihood -20734.8 -20995.6 -21539.0 -20393.3
Implied equilibrium p∗ 0.447 0.478 0.486 0.438
Two Equilibria Model
β1 -0.0008 (0.0012) -0.0007 (0.0012) 0.0008 (0.0009) -0.0009 (0.0012)
α 2.0140 (0.0072) 2.0127 (0.0082) 2.0147 (0.0069) 2.0154 (0.0069)
λ 0.2582 (0.1165) 0.4735 (0.1512) 0.2127 (0.1502) 0.2419 (0.1016)
Log-likelihood -20731.6 -20989.6 -21535.2 -20390.4
Implied equilibria p∗
A,p ∗
B 0.534,0.417 0.541,0.421 0.585,0.459 0.517.0413
Joint-payoﬀ maximizing pJP 0.021 0.021 0.979 0.020
Test for Multiple Equilibria
LRTS 8.3 12.1 7.7 5.8
90th,95th,99th percentiles 3.1,4.3,6.1 3.6,5.7,7.6 2.7,4.4,6.8 2.7,4.3,8.1
of LRTS distribution
Number of market-days 7,598 7,656 7,702 7,657
Number of station-days 30,156 30,332 31,091 29,752
(b) Non-Drivetime Hours
3-4 am 12-1 pm 9-10 pm 10-11 pm
One Equilibrium Model
β1 (assuming α =0 ) -0.2266 (0.0440) -0.1040 (0.0412) 0.0771 (0.0377) 0.0267 (0.0372)
Log-likelihood -12232.1 -20181.1 -19435.8 -18330.7
Implied equilibrium p∗ 0.444 0.474 0.5193 0.507
Two Equilibria Model
β1 -0.2266 (0.0440) -0.1040 (0.0412) 0.0001 (0.0003) 0.0267 (0.0372)
α - - 2.0041 (0.0039) -
λ - ---
Log-likelihood -12232.1 -20181.1 -19435.6 -18330.7
Implied equilibria p∗
A,p ∗
B 0.444 0.474 0.545,0.499 0.507
Test for Multiple Equilibria
LRTS 0 0 0.3 0
90th,95th,99th percentiles 3.2,4.8,7.1 2.3,3.3,7.2 3.0,4.5,7.6 3.1,4.5,9.1
of LRTS distribution
Number of market-days 6,520 7,549 7,482 7,360
Number of station-days 17,811 29,172 28,070 26,449
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Log-likelihoods do not include binomial coeﬃcients which are
constants and independent of the parameters.
31when more stations choose :48-:52 than :53-:57. The second set of results allow for two equilibria to
be played. β1 and α are separately identiﬁed if there are multiple equilibria in the data. The two
equilibria model ﬁts better than the one equilibrium model in each drivetime hour. This is reﬂected
in the LRTS which is reported together with the estimated 90th,9 5 th and 99th percentiles of the
LRTS’s distribution under the null hypothesis of a single equilibrium. Based on these percentiles, the
LRTS is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level in three of the four hours (3-6pm) and signiﬁcant at
the 5% level in the remaining hour (6-7 pm). The β1 coeﬃcient measures whether :53-:57 is more
attractive for commercials independent of any incentive to coordinate. In none of the hours is the
estimate of β1 signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero which is consistent with both of these time intervals
being equally distant from the quarter-hours which are known to be unattractive times for commercials.
The magnitude of α is best understood by examining the implied equilibrium probabilities (p∗
A,p ∗
B)
of choosing :53-:57 for a commercial break. For example, the 4-5 pm coeﬃcients imply that in
equilibrium A stations choose :53-:57 with probability 0.541 (:48-:52 with probability 0.459) and in
equilibrium B stations choose :53-:57 with probability 0.421 (:48-:52 with probability 0.579). The
equilibrium degree of clustering is clearly modest in all of the drivetime hours.
Table 5(b) shows the results for the four non-drivetime hours. In three of the four hours the
estimates of the two equilibria model imply that there is a single equilibrium in the data (LRTS equals
z e r o ) . F o r9 - 1 0p mt h et w oe q u i l i b r i am o d e lﬁts slightly better than the one equilibrium model but
the LRTS is only 0.3 and is not close to being statistically signiﬁcant. Without evidence of multiple
equilibria we cannot infer whether there is an incentive to coordinate during these hours. However, the
presence of multiple equilibria during drivetime but not outside drivetime is consistent with the model
only having multiple equilibria if the incentive to coordinate is strong enough because the incentive
should be greater during drivetime when there are more in-car listeners.
In the spirit of Figure 4(b), Figure 7(a) and (b) illustrate why the data for 4-5pm support the
existence of multiple equilibria but only modest clustering. The proportion of stations choosing :53-
:57 is on the horizontal axis. The bold solid lines show kernel density estimates for the actual data.26
The shape of the density is irregular because of the diﬀerent numbers of stations observed in diﬀerent
26The kernel density is estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel at 101 evenly spaced points between 0 and 1.
32Figure 7: Proportion of Stations Choosing Action 1 (:53-:57) in Each Market-Day Observation in the
Actual Data and in Data Simulated from the Estimated Models






(c) Kernel Densities for Actual Data and Data Simulated from One Equilibrium Model 12-1 pm





















(a) Kernel Densities for Actual Data and Data Simulated from One Equilibrium Model 4-5 pm





















(b) Kernel Densities for Actual Data and Data Simulated from Two Equilibria Model 4-5 pm















33market-day observations. In (a) the light solid line shows the mean kernel density from 50 sets of
simulated data generated from the estimated one equilibrium model and the dashed lines indicate one
standard deviation from this mean density. The density for the actual data lies below the density for
the simulated data for most proportions between 0.25 and 0.7 and slightly above the simulated density
for most of the remaining proportions, i.e., there are more observations where very high or very low
proportions of stations choose :53-:57 than the single equilibrium model predicts. In (b) the light
solid line shows the mean density for data simulated from the estimated two equilibria model. The
density for the actual data is within one standard deviation of the mean density for the simulated
data for almost all proportions. (c) repeats (a) using data for 12-1 pm. The density for the actual
data lies slightly above the density for the simulated data for proportions between 0.4 and 0.6. This
is consistent with the one equilibrium model ﬁtting the data as well as the model which allows two
equilibria.
The modest nature of equilibrium clustering during drivetime may seem surprising given the evi-
dence on how many listeners switch stations to avoid commercials. Does this imply that the avoidance
of commercials has little eﬀect on the value of advertising time or industry revenues? It does not be-
cause of the presence of externalities in the timing game. Each station makes it timing decision
without internalizing how its decision aﬀects the payoﬀ (audience) of other stations. This externality,
combined with the fact that each station may ﬁnd it privately costly to choose the time which it expects
most of the other stations in its market to choose because commercials have to be ﬁtted in around
other programming (the εs in the model), leads to signiﬁcantly less clustering in Nash equilibrium
than there would be if the stations in a radio market maximized their joint payoﬀs. Calculating the
strategies which maximize expected joint payoﬀs is straightforward under the assumption that the εs
remain private information so a station’s strategy can only depend on its own εs.27 If other stations
choose action 1 with probability p−i then the expected beneﬁt to other stations from i choosing action
1i s(Nm − 1)p−i
α
Nm−1 = αp−i. Similarly, if i chooses action 0 then the expected beneﬁtt oo t h e r
27Brock and Durlauf (2001), p. 3318, provide a similar calculation for a social planner’s problem.
34stations is α(1 − p−i). i maximizes expected joint payoﬀsb yc h o o s i n ga c t i o n1i fa n do n l yi f
β1 +2 αp−i + εi1 ≥ 2α(1 − p−i)+εi0 (13)
and the strategies which maximize expected joint payoﬀs will satisfy (pJP)
pJP =
eβ1+2αpJP
eβ1+2αpJP + e2α(1−pJP) (14)
The diﬀerence between (14) and (4) is that α is replaced by 2α:j o i n tp a y o ﬀ maximization eﬀectively
doubles the incentive to coordinate. More than one value of pJP may satisfy (14) but if β1 ≥ 0
then the expected joint payoﬀ maximizing strategy will have pJP ≥ 0.5.T h e j o i n t p a y o ﬀ maximizing
strategies implied by the estimates for the four drivetime hours are shown in Table 5(a). They involve
almost perfect coordination with each station choosing the most attractive interval with probability
around 0.980.
While this calculation relies on the functional forms assumed in the model it is interesting for three
reasons. First, it shows that the modest observed clustering is not necessarily inconsistent with the
claim that the value of radio commercials would be maximized by all stations playing commercials at
the same time so that listeners could not avoid them. Second, it shows that the private costs associated
with the precise timing of commercials may have a large eﬀect on equilibrium timing patterns. It
is interesting to note that television stations, which use more pre-recorded programming in which
commercials can be placed quite precisely, appear to have commercials which overlap more than radio
stations.28 Third, it illustrates that Nash equilibrium outcomes in coordination games can be quite
diﬀerent from joint payoﬀ maximizing outcomes even if, unlike in, for example, a price-setting game,
there is no incentive for an individual player to undercut other players.
The results when the basic model is estimated using the order of songs are shown in Appendix C.
The results are similar to those presented above with no signiﬁcant evidence of multiple equilibria out-
side drivetime and signiﬁcant evidence during drivetime except that the LRTS for 4-5 pm is marginally
insigniﬁcant at the 10% level while the results for 5-6 pm indicate greater clustering of commercials
28Epstein (1998) provides empirical evidence on the timing of commercials by the major television networks during
primetime.
35with a more signiﬁcant LRTS.
5.5 Enriching the Model
I extend the model with multiple equilibria in two stages. The ﬁrst extension allows the proportion
of observations from each equilibrium to vary across markets using the fact that the data contains
multiple observations from the same market. I ﬁnd that most markets stay in the same equilibrium
(commercials clustered at the same time) over time. The second extension introduces covariates into
the model and allows for unobserved market-speciﬁc heterogeneity in the incentive to coordinate. The
incentive to coordinate is stronger in smaller markets and in markets with more concentrated station
ownership.
5.5.1 Market-Speciﬁc λs
The basic model assumes that the probability that any observation is generated by equilibrium A
strategies is the same. This implies that if there are multiple equilibria across markets then there
are also multiple equilibria within markets whereas it seems plausible that if stations are trying to
coordinate on timing then they would stay in the same equilibrium from day-to-day. This assumption
can be relaxed by using the repeated observations from each market to estimate a market-speciﬁc
λm,0 ≤ λm ≤ 1.29 Ic o n t i n u et oa s s u m et h a tβ1 and α are constant across markets so that only




















Even with over 140 markets the parameters can be estimated easily using maximum likelihood. The
estimated values of β1 and α and the implied equilibrium strategies are shown in Table 6 for the
four drivetime hours when action 1 is deﬁned as having a commercial in the :53-:57 time interval.
Standard errors are, as before, calculated using a resampling bootstrap procedure which is repeated
29Consistency of the estimates requires that the number of observations per market tends to inﬁnity. In the data there
a r eu pt o6 0o b s e r v a t i o n sp e rm a r k e t .
36Table 6: Results With Market-Speciﬁc λm Equilibrium Selection Probabilities for Four Drivetime
Hours
3-4 pm 4-5 pm 5-6 pm 6-7 pm
β1 -0.0085 (0.0014) -0.0068 (0.0027) -0.0076 (0.0020) -0.0085 (0.0014)
α 2.0690 (0.0077) 2.0617 (0.0094) 2.0645 (0.0083) 2.0690 (0.0076)
Log-likelihood -19917.3 -20124.4 -20733.6 -19612.6
Implied equilibria p∗
A,p ∗
B 0.573,0.321 0.602,0.331 0.591,0.327 0.571,0.321
Joint-payoﬀ maximizing pJP 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018
Number of market-days 7,598 7,656 7,702 7,657
Number of station-days 30,156 30,332 31,091 29,752
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Log-likelihoods do not include binomial coeﬃcients which are
constants and independent of the parameters.
25 times. Comparison of the log-likelihoods in Tables 5 and 6 shows a sizeable improvement in the
model’s ﬁt. The estimated values of α increase and the equilibrium strategies imply slightly more
clustering of commercials than was implied by the basic model. For example, the 4-5 pm equilibrium
A involves each station choosing :53-:57 with probability 0.602, compared with 0.541 in the basic
model, and equilibrium B involves each station choosing :48-:52 with probability 0.669, compared with
0.579 in the basic model. The estimates of β are negative implying that :48-:52 is more attractive
for commercials than :53-:57. As in the basic model joint payoﬀ maximization would involve almost
perfect coordination on timing.
Figure 8 shows the distribution of the estimated values of λm for 4-5 pm (the histograms for the
other drivetime hours are similar) for markets with at least two stations in the sample. Approximately
two-thirds of the b λms are less than 0.1 or greater than 0.9 which shows that most markets tend to have
commercials clustered at the same time from day-to-day even if these times diﬀer across markets.30
Markets with b λm around 0.5 may either have commercials which are clustered but at diﬀerent times
on diﬀerent days or they may have commercials which are always fairly evenly distributed across the
two time intervals.
Figure 9 maps which markets have high or low b λms. Hollow shapes are markets with b λm > 0.5
(more stations choose :53-:57). Stars represent markets with very high or very low values of b λm.
Three features of the map are of interest. First, the equilibria are not concentrated in diﬀerent regions
30These results are consistent with estimates from logit speciﬁcations similar to those in Table 4 with station-hour ﬁxed
eﬀects. In several speciﬁcations the coeﬃcient on PROPORTION is positive but statistically insigniﬁcant, and much
smaller than the estimates in Table 4, during drivetime.
37Figure 8: Distribution of c λm for 4-5 pm for Markets with at least Two Stations in the Sample





























of the country. For example, states such as California, Florida, Ohio and North Carolina have some
markets with b λm > 0.8 and other markets with b λm ≤ 0.2. This suggests that factors such as diﬀerent
regional tastes for programming cannot explain why commercials are clustered at diﬀerent times in
diﬀerent markets. Second, there appears to be some clustering at a very local level. For example,
Akron-Canton-Cleveland, Appleton-Green Bay, Boston-Portsmouth-Worcester, Los Angeles-Riverside
and San Francisco-San Jose are examples of pairs or groups of very close markets which are largely in
the same equilibrium. In these markets many listeners in the smaller market may listen to stations in
the larger market and, as a result, stations in the smaller market may want to choose the same times
for commercials as stations in the larger market. For example, 55% of listening in Worcester, MA
in Fall 2001 was to stations which were home to the Boston market which is approximately 40 miles
away.31 Third, the largest markets are disproportionately represented by circles. For example, 45% of
the largest 20 markets in the data based on their Arbitron market size rank (New York City to Tampa,
FL) are represented by circles compared with 24% for the remaining markets. One explanation is
that clustering is greater in smaller markets because coordination is, in some sense, easier when there
31It is much rarer for listeners in a large market to listen to stations in a smaller market. For example only 1.8% of
listening in the Boston market in Fall 2001 was to Worcester stations. I estimated a model with the λmsr e s t r i c t e dt ob e
the same in markets where more than 30% of rated listening in t h es m a l l e rm a r k e tw a st os t a t i o n si nt h el a r g e rm a r k e t .
These restrictions were rejected at the 1% signiﬁcance level.















Markets with at least 2 stations 
marked
39are fewer stations. I investigate this possibility by allowing the incentive to coordinate to depend on
covariates such as market size or the number of stations.
5.5.2 Market Characteristics
I now enrich the market-speciﬁc λ model to allow market characteristics to aﬀect the attractiveness
of each interval and the incentive to coordinate. For example, the relative attractiveness of having
early commercials may depend on drivetime commuting patterns. The incentive to coordinate may
also vary with observable and unobservable market characteristics.




m)P−imdt + εidt (16)




are observed market-speciﬁc covariates and ξα
m reﬂects unobserved market-speciﬁc factors which aﬀect
the incentive to coordinate. I normalize β0 to be equal to zero. ξα




m, common across stations within a market, ﬁxed within a market over time and to be
independently and identically distributed across markets with ξα
m ∼ N(0,σ2). σ2 is identiﬁed because
the variance of the εsi sﬁxed. There are multiple equilibria in market m if Xα
mα+ξα
m is large enough
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The integral cannot be computed analytically so I estimate the model using Simulated Maximum
Likelihood (SML). As σ is a parameter to be estimated I draw ums from a standard uniform (U[0,1])
distribution and calculate ξα
ms = σΦ−1(ums) where Φ−1() is the inverse of the cumulative distribution
























where S is the number of draws used for each market. SML estimates are only consistent if, as M and
Dm →∞ , S →∞as well (Gouriéroux and Monfort (1996), p. 43) so I use 50 independent simulations
draws per market.32
The α parameters are identiﬁed by whether commercials are more clustered in markets with high
values of the Xα characteristics. The β1 parameters are identiﬁed by whether commercials are
more clustered in markets where most stations choose :53-:57 and whether this varies with the Xβ
characteristics. σ is identiﬁed from how much variation in the degree of clustering in diﬀerent markets
cannot be explained by the Xα variables. The X
β
m and Xα
m variables and ξα
m are constant over time
so the parameters are identiﬁed from “between-market” variation. It is assumed that the X variables
are exogenous to station timing decisions.
The X
β
m variables are a constant and the COMMUTE variable described in Section 5.3. I use
various combinations of Xα
m variables in addition to a constant. MARKETRANK was also described
in Section 5.3. NUMBERis the average number of rated (non-zero listening share listed by Arbitron)
contemporary music stations which are home to the market during the 4 ratings quarters in 2001. I
use the average value because the very limited amount of within-market variation in the number of
rated stations between ratings quarters is almost entirely due to whether small stations are rated by
A r b i t r o na n dw h e t h e rB I A f nc l a s s i ﬁes them in a contemporary music category. This variation should
not aﬀect the incentive of larger stations to coordinate with each other and given that ξα
m is assumed
to be constant over ratings quarters this sort of variation would give strong predictions for how the
degree of clustering should vary within-markets over time which would almost certainly be rejected
32It is appropriate to mention some further details of the estimation procedure. I use a nested estimation procedure
where for each value of the parameters β1, α and σ I maximize (18) with respect to the market-speciﬁc λm. (18) may
have multiple local maxima so I start the estimation procedure from multiple starting points using 10 simulation draws
per market and then, having established reasonable starting values, restart the estimation using 50 simulation draws per
market. For both stages of the estimation procedure I try both derivative-based and non-derivative based methods to





ms < 0 I assume that the symmetric equilibrium is played even though there could be asymmetric equilibria. It




ms < 0 at the estimated parameters.
41by the data.33 The mean of NUMBER is 12.1 stations (standard deviation 5.0). The markets
with the most stations are Salt Lake City (24), Chicago, Pittsburgh and Wilkes-Barre/Scranton (all
22). These markets have the most stations because of demographics (Spanish-language stations which
are common in many large markets are not included in the contemporary music categories) and the
absence of large markets nearby. OUTLISTENINGmeasures the proportion of contemporary music
listening which is to stations which are outside of the market. This is also averaged across ratings
quarters in 2001. The mean of OUTLISTENINGis 0.20 (0.27) and it varies from 0 (in 20 markets)
to 0.91 in Morristown, NJ. HHI measures ownership concentration among the rated contemporary
music radio stations which are home to the market. This is also averaged across ratings quarters
because there were few within-market mergers in 2001 and within-market variation is therefore largely
due to the number of stations counted as being in the market. Ownership is identiﬁed using the
transactions history of each station listed in BIAfn’s database and this is used to calculate each ﬁrm’s
share of rated contemporary music stations. HHI is the sum of the squares of these shares. The
average of HHI is 0.28 (0.15). It has a maximum of 1 in Reading, PA where there is only one home to
the market contemporary music station and minimum values in Nashville, TN (0.11) and Columbus,
OH (0.12).
Table 7 presents the estimation results using data from 4-5 pm with action 1 deﬁned as having a
commercial in the :53-:57 time interval. The same simulation draws for each market are used in each
speciﬁcation to make the results more comparable across columns. The covariates, apart from the
constants, are normalized to have means equal to zero and standard deviations equal to one. The
coeﬃcients therefore represent the eﬀect of a one standard deviation increase in the variables. Standard
errors are, as before, calculated using a resampling bootstrap procedure with 25 replications.
In column (1) X
β
m includes a constant and COMMUTE while Xα
m only includes a constant. The
incentive to coordinate can vary across markets because of unobserved heterogeneity. Both of the
β1 parameters are very small and insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, indicating earlier commercials
are not systematically more attractive in markets where commuting times are longer or shorter than
33Sweeting (2004a) examines the eﬀect of within-market variation in characteristics on the overlap of commercials using
linear regressions. He ﬁnds that within-market variation has less eﬀect on overlap than between-market variation in the
same characteristics although the coeﬃcients typically have the same sign.
42Table 7: Results with Market-Speciﬁc λm Equilibrium Selection Probabilities and Market Character-
istics for 4-5 pm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
β1
Constant 4.5e-6(1.0e-4) -3.6e-5(9.6e-5) -8.2e-5(5.3e-5) -7.9e-5(7.5e-5) -7.7e-5(7.6e-5)
COMMUTE 1.3e-6(1.1e-4) -1.1e-5(1.1e-4) 5.7e-5(6.1e-5) 6.6e-5(9.1e-5) 6.9e-5(9.4e-5)
α
Constant 2.0773(0.0133) 2.0846(0.0080) 2.0800(0.0124) 2.0897(0.0114) 2.0898(0.0099)
MARKETRANK - 0.0579(0.0123) - 0.0458(0.0089) 0.0436(0.0078)
NUMBER - - -0.0446(0.0107) - -
HHI - - - 0.0390(0.0198) 0.0374(0.0178)
OUTLISTENING - - - - 4.1e-6(0.0075)
σ 0.0816(0.0157) 0.0671(0.0143) 0.0817(0.0151) 0.0668(0.0126) 0.0659(0.0143)
Simulated Log -20025.1 -20003.2 -20018.2 -19999.0 -19998.8
Likelihood
Market-days 7,656 7,656 7,656 7,656 7,656
Station-days 30,332 30,332 30,332 30,332 30,332
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Log-likelihoods do not include binomial coeﬃcients which are
constants and independent of the parameters.
average. This is true for all of the speciﬁcations in the table. The average incentive to coordinate
across markets is 2.0773, which implies equilibrium values of (p∗
A,p ∗
B) of (0.6646,0.3354). Multiple
equilibria cannot be supported if Xα
mα + ξα
m is less than 2, and with an estimated standard deviation
of ξα
m of 0.0816, the probability that a market has Xα
mα + ξα
m less than 2 is approximately 0.17. The
remaining columns examine whether market characteristics explain the heterogeneity in the incentive
to coordinate.
Column (2) includes MARKETRANK in Xα
m and the positive coeﬃcient shows that there is
a greater incentive to coordinate (more clustering) in markets with lower market population. The
MARKETRANK coeﬃcient is highly signiﬁcant. A one standard deviation decrease in MARKETRANK
from its mean, which is equivalent to moving from El Paso, TX to San Jose, CA, changes the equi-
librium values of (p∗
A,p ∗
B) from (0.6716,0.3284) to (0.5989,0.4011) if ξα
m =0 . The reduction in the
estimate of σ is consistent with MARKETRANK explaining some of the heterogeneity in the degree
of clustering across markets. Column (3) replaces MARKETRANK with NUMBER. The nega-
tive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient indicates that the incentive to coordinate is lower in markets with more
43stations, although the estimate of σ is the same as in column (1). This suggests that variation in the
incentive to coordinate is determined more by factors which vary with market size than the number
of rated contemporary music stations in the market which, as noted above, is larger in Salt Lake City
(ranked 34) and Wilkes-Barre/Scranton (67) than New York City (1) and Los Angeles.(2).
Column (4) includes MARKETRANK and HHI in Xα
m.T h e p o s i t i v e c o e ﬃcient on HHI,w h i c h
is signiﬁcant at the 5% level, indicates that there is greater incentive to coordinate in markets with
more concentrated ownership. This is consistent with the analysis in Section 5.4 where I showed
that stations would coordinate more if they internalized how their individual timing decisions aﬀected
the audience of other stations because common owners should internalize these externalities. With
MARKETRANK equal to its mean, a one standard deviation decrease in HHI (from 0.28 to 0.13)
changes the equilibrium values of (p∗
A,p ∗
B) from (0.6730,0.3237) to (0.6348,0.3652) if ξα
m =0 .C o l -
umn (5) includes MARKETRANK, HHI and OUTLISTENING in Xα
m. If markets with more
stations have weaker incentives to coordinate then we might also expect that the ability of listeners to
receive stations in other markets would also weaken the incentive. However, the OUTLISTENING
coeﬃc i e n ti sa l m o s ti d e n t i c a lt oz e r o .
6C o n c l u s i o n
Many models with interesting interactions between agents have multiple equilibria. In much of the
applied literature multiplicity has been seen as only creating estimation problems. Common responses
to this perceived problem such as changing the model to guarantee uniqueness or assuming that only
one equilibrium is played in the data are unsatisfactory if it is plausible, as it surely often is, that the
data contains observations from diﬀerent equilibria. The central idea in this paper is that not only is it
possible to estimate models where there are multiple equilibria both in the model and in the data but
that the existence of multiple equilibria can actually help to identify the parameters. The intuition
is that multiple equilibria only arise when interactions are important and the existence of multiple
equilibria in the data allows us to rule out parameters which cannot support all of the equilibria. I
illustrate this idea using a simple game in which the parameters are only separately identiﬁed if there
are multiple equilibria both in the game and in the data.
44The game is used to study the timing of commercial breaks by music radio stations. A station,
which sells the audience of its commercial breaks to advertisers, may have an incentive to play its
commercials at the same time as other stations in its market to reduce the number of listeners who
avoid its commercials by switching to music on other stations. However, the fact that stations do
tend to play commercials at the same time (Figure 1) could also be explained by common factors, such
as Arbitron’s methodology for estimating station ratings, which make certain times attractive for all
stations to play commercials. I use the possibility that stations may coordinate on playing commercials
at diﬀerent times in diﬀerent markets, together with the assumption that common factors are the same
across markets, to identify the incentive to coordinate. I ﬁnd evidence of multiple equilibria, allowing
the incentive to coordinate to be identiﬁed, during drivetime. The estimated incentive to coordinate has
only modest eﬀects on Nash equilibrium timing strategies but implies that commercials would overlap
almost perfectly if each station internalized how the timing of its commercials aﬀects the audience of
other stations. I ﬁnd that markets tend to stay in the same equilibrium over time and that commercials
overlap more in smaller markets and in markets with more concentrated station ownership.
Two issues merit further discussion. The ﬁrst issue is how the overlap of commercials aﬀects
welfare. The externalities in the coordination game suggest that advertising time would become more
valuable if commercials overlapped more than they do at present. Stations would extract some of
this value through higher prices to advertisers. Increased listenership to commercials is one possible
reason why increases in ownership concentration in local radio markets have been associated with
small increases in advertising prices (Brown and Williams (2002)). A large increase in revenues might
indirectly beneﬁt listeners by encouraging station entry, which would increase programming variety,
and by encouraging investments in station quality. The free-rider problem means that an individual
listener ignores these eﬀects when switching stations. However, a welfare calculation would also take
into account listeners’ disutility from hearing commercials they do not value and which they are unable
to pay to avoid.
The second issue is whether the idea that multiple equilibria can help to identify parameters applies
in models other than the type of game considered here where players have an incentive to choose the
same action. In many settings, especially in Industrial Organization, a more natural assumption
45may be that agents want to choose diﬀerent actions to avoid competition. For example, if ﬁrm A
provides a high quality product then ﬁrm B may want to have a low quality product to soften price
competition. Can multiple equilibria in the data help to provide identiﬁcation in this setting? This
question deserves detailed consideration in its own right but a simple example suggests that they can.
Suppose that A and B make simultaneous product quality choices in a set of independent markets (an
example might be two gasoline retailers deciding whether each outlet should be full-serve or self-serve)
and that, in the data, we always observe one high quality ﬁrm and one low quality ﬁrm. If ﬁrm
A is the high quality ﬁrm in every market then this pattern could be explained either by strategic
diﬀerentiation or by A having a relative cost advantage in producing a high quality product. On the
other hand, if we observe A as the high quality ﬁrm in some markets and B as the high quality ﬁrm
in other markets then if we treat these diﬀerent outcomes as representing multiple equilibria in the
quality choice game and are willing to assume away perfect negative correlation in ﬁrm costs then this
may provide convincing evidence that strategic diﬀerentiation is important.
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50A Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
Proposition 1. All parameter vectors (β1,α)w h e r e( β1,α) support only one equilibrium are not
separately identiﬁed.
Proof. If (β1,α) support only one equilibrium then the single equilibrium choice probability p∗ satisﬁes
p∗(β1,α)=
eβ1+αp∗
eβ1+αp∗ + eα(1−p∗) (19)




p∗(β1,α)n1m(1 − p∗(β1,α))Nm−n1m (20)
I show that (β1,α) are not separately identiﬁed by naming (β0
1,α 0)6=( β1,α)pairs which also support one
equilibrium choice probability p∗0(β0
1,α 0) with p∗0(β0
1,α 0)=p∗(β1,α),i m p l y i n gt h a tPr(n1m|β1,α,N m)=
Pr(n1m|β0
1,α 0,N m). I name particular (β0
1,α 0) pairs but there is a continuum of pairs which would
work.
If α>0, consider α0 =0and β0
1 = β1 − α +2 αp∗.A s α0=0 there is only a single equilibrium
p∗0(β0











eβ1+αp∗ + eα(1−p∗) (21)
so p∗0(β0
1,α 0)=p∗(β1,α) and (β1,α) are not separately identiﬁed.




Consider α0 =1and β0
1 = β1 +1−2p∗. As a necessary condition for there to be multiple equilibria is
that the maximum slope of a station’s reaction function (1
2α) is at least 1, there is a single equilibrium.34
(β0






1+α0p∗0 + eα0(1−p∗0) =
eβ1+1−2p∗+p∗0
eβ1+1−2p∗+p∗0 + e(1−p∗0) (23)
If p∗0(β0





which veriﬁes that p∗0(β0
1,α 0)=p∗(β1,α) and (β1,α) are not separately identiﬁed.
Proposition 2. Parameter vectors (β1,α) which support two distinct stable equilibria are separately
identiﬁe di fC o n d i t i o n s1a n d2h o l d .













34Recall from Section 2.1 that all equilibria are symmetric so that there is an equilibrium where R(p)=p (the reaction
function crosses the 45
0 line). The reaction function is continuous on [0,1]. Taken together these facts imply that for
there to be two distinct equilibria the slope of the reaction function must be greater than 1 at some point.
51with p∗
A(β1,α) 6= p∗
B(β1,α). Ip r o c e e di nt w os t a g e s :ﬁrst, I apply a well-known result to show that
(p∗
A,p ∗




First stage: (25) is the pmf of a binomial mixture distribution with two components. The bi-
nomial probabilities for the two components are p∗
A and p∗
B, and the mixing proportion parameter is
λ. Proposition 4 of Teicher (1963) and the lemma of Margolin et al. (1989) give suﬃcient conditions
for p∗
A,p∗
B and λ to be identiﬁed. Applying these results, (p∗
A,p ∗





B ((β1,α) support more than one equilibrium), 0 <λ<1 (Condition 1) and some









B as equilibrium choice probabilities. Suppose not and that (β0
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= β1 + α(2p∗









B − 1) (29)
Combining the equations in (28) and (29) gives













B. This contradicts p∗
A 6= p∗
B.
B Estimation and Testing
B.1 EM Algorithm Estimation of the Basic Model with Multiple Equilibria
This Appendix describes how the EM Algorithm can be used to estimate the parameters of the basic





B(β1,α). I use the algorithm to estimate p∗
A, p∗
B and λ. The estimates of p∗
A and p∗
B are then used
to provide estimates of β1 and α. The log-likelihood in terms of p∗
A, p∗





















B then one cannot identify λ because the two components of the
mixture are identical (indeed λ is not really deﬁned). If λ =0then one cannot identify p
∗
A (no observations come from
this component so there is no information on its binomial probability) and if λ =1then one cannot identify p
∗
B.I f a l l
groups have only 1 or 2 members then the only possible (n1m,N m −n1m) outcomes are (2,0), (1,1) and (0,2). It is easy




B,λ) which give the same probabilities for these outcomes.
The intuition is that as the probabilities sum to 1 there are only two equations and three unknowns.
52where M is the number of independent repetitions of the game.

















































The EM Algorithm exploits the fact that the solution to (32)-(34) is also a solution to iterating a
two-step “Expectation(E)-Maximization(M)” procedure.36 The E-step takes the conditional expecta-
tion of the complete data log-likelihood by replacing indicator variables for the equilibrium being played
(the ZA
msi n( 6 ) )w i t hb τm which is τm evaluated at the current values of the parameters (c p∗
A, c p∗
B,b λ).








lnb λ + n1m ln c p∗




(1 − b τm)
h
ln(1 − b λ)+n1m ln c p∗





The M-step involves maximizing (36) with respect to the parameters b λ, c p∗
A and c p∗
B. The new
parameter estimates are















m=1(1 − b τm)n1m
PM
m=1(1 − b τm)Nm
(39)
The E- and M-steps are iterated until the likelihood and the parameter estimates converge. The
ﬁnal estimates c p∗
A and c p∗





1 − c p∗
A
!
= c β1 + b α(2c p∗





1 − c p∗
B
!
= c β1 + b α(2c p∗
B − 1) (41)
36Dempster et al. (1977) show that an EM iteration always increases the value of the likelihood so convergence is
guaranteed when the likelihood is bounded above as it is here.
53I then check whether c β1 and b α support c p∗
A and c p∗
B as stable equilibria. If they do then c β1 and b α
are the ML estimates. If they do not then it is necessary to maximize (12) with respect to β1 and
α directly. This requires the calculation of the p∗
A(β1,α) and p∗
B(β1,α) which β1 and α support as
stable equilibria at each step of the maximization.
B.2 Testing for Multiple Equilibria Using a Bootstrap
B.2.1 Bootstrap Test for the Homogeneity of Mixtures
Chen and Chen (2001) propose using a parametric bootstrap to estimate the distribution of the LRTS
in testing for the homogeneity of a binomial mixture model against the alternative of a two component
mixture. This simulation exercise provides evidence that this approach gives a test of the correct size.
In each simulation data is generated from a single component binomial distribution Binomial(n,p)
where p is chosen as 0.52 (the proportion of stations choosing action 1 is close to 0.5 in the actual data)
and n is 1 in 50 repetitions, 2 in 50 repetitions and so on up to a value of 10 in 50 repetitions. This data
is used to estimate a single component binomial model (estimated parameter b p) and a two component
binomial model (estimated parameters b λ, c pA, c pB) using the EM Algorithm described above. The LRTS
is calculated to compare the two models. The estimate b p is used to generate 249 new sets of data
from a single component model Binomial(n, b p) with n v a r y i n ga sb e f o r e . O n ea n dt w oc o m p o n e n t
models are estimated for each set of data in order to estimate the distribution of the LRTS under the
null of a single component. The jth-order statistic estimates the
j
250th quantile of the distribution of
the LRTS. This estimated distribution is used to assess whether the LRTS for the initial set of data
is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
500 simulations are used. The LRTS is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level in 6 simulations
(1.2%), at the 5% level in 20 simulations (4.0%) and at the 10% level in 47 simulations (9.4%).
B.2.2 Conservative Assessment of the Signiﬁcance of Multiple Equilibria
The previous simulation exercise examined the use of a parametric bootstrap of the LRTS’s distribution
in comparing a single component binomial model against a two component binomial mixture model
with no constraints on the components of the mixture pA and pB. The economic model in Section 2
does impose the constraint that the components must be supported as stable equilibria in the model.
This simulation exercise conﬁrms that imposing this constraint on the two component model (weakly)
lowers the value of the LRTS (the one component model remains unconstrained). This implies that
the testing procedure described in Section 4.3 will give conservative results, i.e., I am less likely to
reject the null hypothesis of a single equilibrium.
In each simulation data is generated from the model with a single equilibrium where action 1 is
chosen with probability p∗ =0 .52 and there is 1 observed player in 50 repetitions, 2 players in 50
repetitions and so on up to 10 players in 50 repetitions. This data is used to estimate a single
equilibrium model, a two equilibria model and an unconstrained two component binomial model where
c pA and c pB do not have to be supported as stable equilibria. I calculate (a) an LRTS comparing the
one equilibrium model and the two equilibria model and (b) an LRTS comparing the one equilibrium
model and the unconstrained two component binomial model.
500 simulations are used. In every simulation the (a) comparison LRTS is less than or equal
to the (b) comparison LRTS as expected. It is strictly less in 243 simulations. Figure 10 shows
the cumulative distribution function of the LRTS for each comparison. The diﬀerence between the
distribution functions suggests that my assessments of whether there is signiﬁcant evidence of multiple
equilibria may be quite conservative.
54Figure 10: CDF of the LRTS Comparing the One Equilibrium Model and the Two Equilibria Model
and the CDF of the LRTS Comparing the One Equilibrium Model and the Two Component Binomial
Mixture Model
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C Results from the Basic Model With Actions Deﬁned by the Order
of Songs and Commercial Breaks
Table 8 presents the results from estimating the basic model with action 1 deﬁn e da sh a v i n gac o m m e r -
cial break with one song remaining in the hour (action 0 two songs). The results are generally similar
to those in Table 5. The main diﬀerences are that the LRTS for 4-5 pm is marginally insigniﬁcant
at the 10% level (recall that my testing procedure gives conservative assessments of the signiﬁcance of
multiple equilibria) and the LRTS for 5-6 pm is much more signiﬁcant than before. The equilibrium
strategies for 5-6 pm and 6-7 pm also imply greater overlap of commercials than in Table 5.
55Table 8: Basic Model Results with Timing Deﬁned by the Order of Songs
(a) Afternoon Drivetime Hours
3-4 pm 4-5 pm 5-6 pm 6-7 pm
One Equilibrium Model
β1 (assuming α =0 ) -0.1390 (0.0372) -0.0708 (0.0284) -0.0540 (0.0339) -0.1907 (0.0347)
Log-likelihood -18722.4 -18948.8 -19136.0 -18468.2
Implied equilibrium p∗ 0.465 0.482 0.487 0.452
Two Equilibria Model
β1 0.0002 (0.0014) -0.0003 (0.0004) 0.0009 (0.0015) 0.0017 (0.0018)
α 2.0112 (0.0079) 2.0070 (0.0047) 2.0176 (0.0080) 2.0250 (0.0108)
λ 0.1994 (0.1456) 0.5310 (0.1133) 0.3106 (0.1575) 0.1080 (0.0760)
Log-likelihood -18710.6 -18947.7 -19125.8 -18464.1
Implied equilibria p∗
A,p ∗
B 0.568,0.440 0.519,0.441 0.591,0.438 0.609,0.433
Joint-payoﬀ maximizing pJP 0.979 0.021 0.980 0.980
Test for Multiple Equilibria
LRTS 5.7 2.2 20.5 8.1
90th,95th,99th percentiles 2.7,4.1,8.5 2.5,4.5,8.5 3.0,4.8,9.7 2.8,4.2,11.2
of LRTS distribution
Number of market-days 7,447 7,574 7,563 7,470
Number of station-days 27,105 27,362 27,622 26,819
(b) Non-Drivetime Hours
3-4 am 12-1 pm 9-10 pm 10-11 pm
One Equilibrium Model
β1 (assuming α =0 ) -0.1478 (0.0416) -0.0885 (0.0341) 0.1540 (0.0363) 0.1306 (0.0349)
Log-likelihood -10116.8 -17503.6 -16968.4 -16039.9
Implied equilibrium p∗ 0.463 0.478 0.538 0.533
Two Equilibria Model
β1 -0.1478 (0.0416) -0.0885 (0.0341) 0.0003 (0.0007) 0.1306 (0.0349)
α - - 2.0075 (0.0060) -
λ - - 0.3734 (0.1610) -
Log-likelihood -10116.8 -17503.6 16968.4 -16039.9
Implied equilibria p∗
A,p ∗
B 0.463 0.477 0.561,0.466 0.533
Joint-payoﬀ maximizing pJP - - 0.980 -
Test for Multiple Equilibria
LRTS 0 0 0.1 0
90th,95th,99th percentiles 3.0,3.7,8.8 2.4,3.4,5.7 2.3,4.3,6.6 4.2,6.0,11.0
of LRTS distribution
Number of market-days 6,086 7,365 7,268 7,127
Number of station-days 14,653 25,288 24,585 23,212
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Log-likelihoods do not include binomial coeﬃcients which are
constants and independent of the parameters.
56